“Terrorism” is an extremely loaded word. But is it true, as the saying goes, that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter?

Yes and no. Strictly speaking, terrorism is a tactical approach: one that, as the name indicates, takes as its goal the creation of terror in the target populace, specifically by targeting civilians (who are normally off-limits). That may or may not be the tactic used by someone fighting for freedom — and it may or may not be the label attached to them by the other side, which has a vested interest in painting the opponent in an negative light.

But stepping back for a moment: bear in mind that “normally off-limits” is very much a modern attitude. Historically, pretty much every army ever considered civilians to be fair game, and terrorizing them was simply part of how you waged war. Attitudes against that didn’t start to be codified into law until the late nineteenth century, so any novel set in or taking its inspiration from earlier eras will feel anachronistic if it shows widespread disapproval for the practice.

Which is why, although this essay was originally conceived of around the topic of terrorism, I’ve retitled it “Unconventional Warfare.” Because there genuinely is a division — not just in modern times, but historically — between armed conflict as it’s usually expected to be waged, and the forms of it that appear when the conventions go out the window.

Don’t read too much into my choice of title, though, which was selected to go well with the essays coming up in the next few weeks. There are a number of overlapping expressions here, not all of which get used consistently. “Unconventional warfare” as a term of art is a broad umbrella encompassing lots of combat-adjacent activities like propaganda, espionage, and sabotage, many of which have come up in previous New Worlds essays. “Asymmetric warfare” tends to mean situations in which the two sides are unequally matched: one is far stronger in manpower, weaponry, funding, and so forth. U.S. doctrine also includes the concept of “irregular warfare,” which includes methods other than armed conflict.

What these have in common is the idea that one or both parties are in a situation where they can’t expect to win the war (or rather, achieve their strategic objectives) by conventional means alone. Therefore, they supplement with other methods . . . or rely on them completely.

And that brings us back to terrorism, which nowadays we often use as a synonym for “insurgency,” even though an insurgency (which could very well be fighting for freedom) may or may not be using overtly terror-based tactics. If Force A is in control — either of their own country, or somebody else’s — and Force B wants to overthrow that control, Force B often does not have the option of assembling a normal army and meeting Force A in the field, at least not right away. They need to buy time and build strength, and even then, they may very well fail unless they gain the backing of an outside power willing to supply an army. (This is especially true in modern times, where the investment and technical know-how necessary to field an effective army is vastly higher than in the days of swords and bows.)

In that situation, how can you expect to win? If you can’t beat them in the field, you have to attack some other, hopefully weaker point: often an economic or political one. Make the maintenance of control too expensive to sustain, so that Force A goes home (if they’re outsiders) or collapses logistically. Or turn public opinion enough against Force A that there’s no longer the will to spend resources on the enterprise, even if those resources are still there. In practice, the economics and politics often go hand in hand, as it takes a lot of political support to approach actual bankruptcy: the will often runs out before the money, but the expenditure of money can erode the will.

Theoretically, one of the ways to achieve this is through the infliction of terror. A society that accepts the deaths of soldiers in war as the price of achieving their objectives may feel very differently when they, the civilians, are suddenly at risk. This works a great deal better against outsiders than it does against your own home-grown government (however oppressive the latter may be), because it isn’t enough just to sap the will of the enemy; you also need to win people to your own cause. The slaughter of innocents is an extremely poor way to do that when the innocents in question are also your people. It also runs the significant risk of galvanizing the opposition instead of weakening it; by striking at civilians, you make them angrier instead of just afraid.

Targeted (and therefore less terroristic) attacks can be more effective. In particular, one common and potentially useful tactic is to go after those working as — or at least seen as — collaborators. This sends a message that siding with the enemy will put you and probably also your family in danger . . . so which are you gonna choose? That has the potential to degrade support for Force A in the general populace, with more people at least choosing neutrality, if not support for Force B. It doesn’t always work, but it has a much better success rate than indiscriminate mass murder (e.g. through bombing attacks).

Or just go the non-violent route, leveraging other elements under that “unconventional warfare” umbrella (as previously discussed in Year Nine‘s essay on civil strife). In modern times, this often has a better success rate, as it invites the disproportionate retaliation of Force A without committing the kinds of violence that might erode support for Force B. Especially against a local enemy instead of one from outside, this is an excellent way to tip the balance of opinion in your favor: fight without fighting.

Remember, however, that such tactics rely pretty heavily on communication. And that applies in both types of situation, because a violent insurgency is itself attempting to send a message through its attacks! What this looks like in modern times cannot be ported wholesale to the past or settings inspired by same, where the capacity to convince the general public of anything is more limited — and so, too, is their power to do anything about it. Republican Rome cared a fair bit what the senatorial class thought about its wars, much less what the common freeman in the street had to say.

But that doesn’t mean asymmetric warfare is new. It was a feature of every past conflict between a state and the non-state polities on its borders, where the latter couldn’t stand up to the former in the field. They would retreat to the inaccessible corners of their land, staging guerilla attacks and maybe reprisals against communities that capitulated, hoping for the powers that be to decide that holding onto their land was too expensive (in wealth, lives, or both) to be worth it.

Sometimes they succeeded. But it’s never a sure thing, with the calculus depending on a wide range of factors, many of which are outside the resistance’s control. The withdrawal of an occupying force might have as much to do with political turmoil at home as with anything the resistance has done . . . which is not the same as saying that what they did is irrelevant. If occupation had been peaceful and without cost, it could have potentially lasted through the turmoil. Anyone fighting this kind of war has to be prepared for the long haul, and ready to seize their moment when it comes.